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ABSTRACT 
In his concurrence with the Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justice 
Thurgood Marshall postulated that levels of support for capital punishment are associated 
with the amount of knowledge about the death penalty process. He suggested that exposure 
to information about capital punishment produces sentiments in opposition to capital 
punishment except in instances for which support is based on retributive beliefs. These 
notions have become known as the Marshall Hypothesis and have been empirically tested 
among a variety of populations. The research presented in this thesis adds to that body of 
literature by testing these ideas among a sample of students in the College of Justice and 
Safety at Eastern Kentucky University. Results from a self-administered survey provide 
support for two of the three hypotheses originally posited by Justice Marshall. Implications 
of these findings are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Death Penalty Information Center (2019a), Americans’ support 
for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972. Nonetheless there are still more individuals 
in favor (55%) of capital punishment than opposed (41%). Why do the majority of 
Americans’ still support such a relic of archaic times in 2019? Supreme Court Justice 
Thurgood Marshall expressed his thoughts on this question in his 1972 concurring opinion 
for the Furman v. Georgia case, in which he surmised that the problem lies in the fact that 
the American public was largely unaware about the death penalty in the United States. It 
has been 47 years since Justice Marshall gave us what is known today as the Marshall 
Hypothesis, which can be broken down into three separate hypotheses that can be tested 
using empirical social science research methods.  The three hypotheses are (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972): 
1) Support for capital punishment is associated with the lack of knowledge about it. 
2) Exposure to information about capital punishment produces sentiments in 
opposition to capital punishment. 
3) Exposure to information about capital punishment will have little or no impact on 
those who support it for retributive reasons distinguished from instrumental 
reasons. 
Opponents of capital punishment may wonder how, it possible that members of 
modern society, with information streaming around them at all times, are not informed 
enough to recognize concerns  associated with the capital punishment process. In the 
United States, government is set up in a way public opinion matters a great deal, which 
values populism, so it would be very difficult to put into motion the necessary means to 
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abolish the death penalty without first gauging the level of support and understanding the 
reasons behind it (Bohm, 2003). 
The purpose of this thesis is to put the Marshall Hypothesis to test and to explore the 
underlying issues surrounding support for the death penalty by surveying Justice and Safety 
college students at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU). This research will contribute to 
the literature because all three of Marshall’s hypotheses are tested, which is not common 
among existing studies.   
THE MILESTONE CASE: FURMAN V. GEORGIA 
The landmark case from which the Marshall Hypothesis stems is Furman v. 
Georgia. This case began in January of 1972 and was decided in June of the same year. 
The petitioner in this case, Furman, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death 
after. He was burglarizing a private home when a family member happened to discover 
him. Furman attempted to flee and during the process; according to him, he tripped and 
fell.  He claimed that the fall caused the gun he was carrying to fire, which subsequently 
killed a resident of the home. The question posed in his Supreme Court case, the lead case 
decided together with  Jackson v. Georgia  and Branch v. Texas (death penalty cases that 
did not involve murder) was, "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in 
(these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments?" (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p.239)  The Court ruled in a five to 
four majority that yes, “…the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments” (pp. 
239-240). Abnormally, each Justice decided to publish a separate opinion resulting in more 
than 200 pages of their thoughts and opinions surrounding the case(s) and the ultimate 
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ruling. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall believed the death penalty to be 
unconstitutional in all instances while the other opinions focused on the arbitrary nature of 
the imposition of death sentences, including a racial bias against black defendants. This 
major decision by the Court forced the states and the national legislature to reconsider the 
specific statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be 
administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner. This ruling imposed a short-lived 
moratorium on the death penalty, which required state and federal officials to refine their 
criminal statutes in order to ensure that capital punishment would therefore not be 
considered arbitrary nor discriminatory. Later to be essentially overturned by Greg v. 
Georgia in 1976, when the Supreme Court ruled, “The imposition of the death penalty for 
the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both in the United States and in 
England [.]  At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a 
common sanction in every State…” (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 176). 
THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS 
Justice Thurgood Marshall reasoned in his 1972 Furman concurrence that the American 
public was largely unaware about the death penalty in the United States. In his concurring 
opinion, Marshall wrote, “The question with which we must deal is not whether a 
substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital 
punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all 
information presently available” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 362). To clarify his 
explanation, Marshall further commented, “This is not to suggest that with respect to this 
test of unconstitutionality people are required to act rationally; they are not. With respect 
4 
to this judgment, a violation of the Eighth Amendment is totally dependent on the 
predictable, subjective, emotional reactions of informed citizens” (p. 362). 
The first element of the Marshall Hypothesis infers that support for capital 
punishment is associated with a lack of knowledge about the death penalty.  That specific 
hypothesis was taken from the following portion of Marshall’s opinion (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972, p. 364):  
…that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life 
imprisonment, that convicted murderers are rarely executed but usually 
sentenced to a term in prison; that convicted murderers usually are model 
prisoners, and that they almost always become law abiding citizens upon 
their release from prison; that the costs of executing a capital offender 
exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that while in prison, a convict 
under sentence of death performs none of the useful functions that life 
prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing process to 
ferret out likely recidivists for execution; and that the death penalty may 
actually stimulate criminal activity. 
 
The second specific hypothesis suggests that opposition to the death penalty will 
increase with exposure to information about it.  This element came from Marshall’s belief 
that, “…this information would surely convince average citizens that the death penalty was 
unwise” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 364). In the third portion of to his hypothesis, 
Marshall recognized that even if American’s knew the information, which he had pointed 
out with his previous two hypotheses, that they still may not consider the death penalty 
morally reprehensible or opposite to primarily due to retributive reasons. It has been 
established that retributivists are less likely to respond to knowledge-based claims on 
matters such as the death penalty (Shafer-Landau, 1996). In his opinion, Marshall wrote, 
“Retaliation, vengeance, and retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable 
aspirations for a government in a free society” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 343). He went 
on to say, “The history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that 
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retribution for its own sake is improper” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 345) and that “no 
one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society” (Furman v. 
Georgia, 1972, p. 363). Marshall’s view of retribution, which he equated with purposeless 
vengeance, was so negative that he maintained (p. 363-364):  
I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people 
would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that 
the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material 
already considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore 
unconstitutional.  
 
Justice Marshall’s opinion has reached a wide audience, and the originality of his 
thoughts and the resulting general hypothesis has captured the attention of many social 
scientists. These investigators tend to agree that, while testing Marshall’s ideas is 
important, there is some uncertainty concerning what specifically Marshall meant by 
“knowledge” and, therefore, how this concept should be measured so that his hypotheses 
may be tested empirically.  While no scale is flawless, a variety of items and composite 
measures have now been used to quantify knowledge and opinions about the death penalty, 
and there have been several tests of the different elements of Justice Marshall’s hypotheses.  
Results of these studies, as well as a brief discussion of the history of the death penalty and 
some theoretical outlooks about capital punishment in this country will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The purpose of this literature review is to present a summary of what is known 
about levels of support an opposition for the death penalty in America, as well as the 
validity of the Marshall Hypothesis regarding capital punishment in the United States. 
American support for the death penalty is a complicated matter to say the very least. 
However, according to the Death Penalty Information Center (2019a), Americans’ support 
for the death penalty is at its lowest since 1972; nonetheless, there are still more in favor 
(55%) than opposed (41%). Why is this? Is Justice Marshall’s belief that “American 
citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 362) 
still correct? Information and results presented in this thesis will help to answer that 
question. The following sections in this literature review will summarize a brief history of 
capital punishment, analyze David Garland’s thoughts on the Furman case, investigate the 
ideologies associated with support or opposition to the death penalty, and consider past 
studies that have tested the Marshall Hypothesis.  
HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
To understand the concept of public support or opposition, I feel that we must first 
consider the history of the death penalty. Garland (2010) does a great job of explaining the 
historical modes of capital punishment in Peculiar Institution, including the breakdown of 
the following: The Early-Modern Mode, The Modern Mode, and The Late-Modern Mode. 
These eras are different from what we recognize in the United States due to the limited 
period of American history. In the United States there is the “early period” which consists 
of 1608 to 1929, the “premodern era” which consists of 1930 to 1967, and last the “modern 
era” which began in late 1976 and early 1977 through present day (Paternoster, 1991).  
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The early-modern mode covers the years of 1400 to 1700 and, during this time, the 
use of capital punishment was in the form of state building to assert and preserve authority 
by its leaders. The death penalty was carried out as a public spectacle of awe and terror. 
The sovereign ruling elites were the only individuals able to legally enforce capital 
punishment, and acting as the one great power, they were able to push religious narratives 
that were used to prescribe this form of punishment in order to prove a moral duty of 
performing none other than God’s work. During this period, it is important to note that 
there was a lot of class stratification and demonization of criminals creating the “them” 
and “us” concept, which lead to the fear in citizens of ever questioning the leader’s 
decisions and thus creating minimal debate over the use of capital punishment.  
During the modern mode, which ran from 1700 until the mid-1900s, history shows 
some major shifts in capital punishment including the reasoning behind the use as well as 
changes in the methods to which executions were carried out. The formation of nation state 
stability diminished the need for and legitimacy of the death penalty so it is here where the 
shift took place from performing a public spectacle to increasing state bureaucratization 
which included the increased role of criminal justice actors in capital punishment in 
replacement of traditional monarchies. This shift also decreased the moral justification 
based on religiosity. Reasoning, however, found a new home in the form of scientifically 
upholding the social contract by promoting justice and safety through a crime control 
rationale. In moving away from the public spectacle, the executions were relocated from 
public squares to the front gates of prisons before eventually being moved to be hidden 
behind prison walls much in a fashion as they are today. The range of crimes that capital 
punishment could be handed out in response to was dramatically narrowed during this 
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period, but the use of the dangerous other explanation still was prevalently used against the 
condemned to clear the conscious of the enforcing actors involved. These reforms 
mentioned were being initiated by enlightened monarchs at the time and the forces that 
drove the restructuring and abolitions being driven by democratization and populism. 
Finally, the late-modern mode, or what is labelled late modernity is described as 
starting in 1960 and onward to present day. During this time, capital punishment began to 
be perceived as an increasingly old-fashioned and unnecessary remnant, a relic of archaic 
times so to speak. Liberalism and democratization had come to a maturity and social 
welfare was known as the key driving force. The snowball effects with abolition began 
hitting several nations across the board with the end of World War II. The legal parameters 
of capital punishment increased, and reforms began piling up transforming into what is 
now recognized as super due process. It was around the late 1970s before the use of the 
death penalty really started to decline in the United States. The key differences in the 
United States as opposed to the other civilized Western nations is that the United States 
has an incomplete process of delocalization, in that power is held at too many levels with 
the possibility of local, state, and federal overreaches. Still as seen today, it has become 
harder to legitimize the use of capital punishment even in the United States where close to 
half the states have already abolished its use. The death penalty is supposed to be reserved 
as an ultimate penalty for ultimate crimes but even then, it still does not seem to justify the 
use when the extreme capitalistic nature of pharmaceutical companies is at the point of 
refusing to sell the lethal injection cocktails.  
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DAVID GARLANDS’ TAKE ON THE AMERICAN CLASSIC 
As David Garland (2010) discussed in Peculiar Institution in Chapter Eight in 
depth, he views Furman v. Georgia as an “American Classic” as it is a perfect example of 
how legislation should lead and not follow. Furman was the catalyst in the way that lead 
to an endless negotiation of compromise, which is how Garland defines legalism. It was a 
monumental study in ambivalence and focused on procedure over substance as well as 
individual narrowly defined cases as opposed to general policy. Public opinion, the leading 
force of populism, was a major leading factor, and like in all matters in the United States 
legal system, has developed into an immense consumption of lives and economic 
resources. Garland views the Furman majority ruling as proof that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional on the grounds of its use being “lawless, pointless, uncivilized, and 
inhumane” (p.227). In comparison to other nations in the Western world, Garland contends 
that Furman was the American equivalent to the elite-led abolition processes taking place. 
The reform effort was supported by America’s national elites, argued by civil rights 
litigants, and mandated by liberal elite Supreme Court justices. 
Research consistent with Garland’s (2010) ideas has shown that public opinion is 
influential in the retention of the death penalty in at least four ways. First, it could influence 
legislators to support death penalty statutes. It can encourage some prosecutors to seek the 
death penalty in cases they might normally consider a plea-bargain. In addition, it may 
discourage some state officials from commuting death sentences. And finally, it might be 
indirectly used by justices of the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts as 
a measure of "evolving standards of decency” regarding what constitutes "cruel and 
unusual punishment” in state constitutions and under the Eighth Amendment of the United 
10 
States Constitution (Bedau, 1987; Bohm, 1991; Furman v. Georgia, 1972; Ellsworth & 
Ross, 1983). 
Garland (2010) pointed out that the influence of the Furman ruling was intense and 
far-reaching. A total of 587 condemned men and two women were released from death row 
and given the sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, creating a possible 
new future for them. The decision invalidated all of the nation’s death penalty statutes and 
nullified the existing capital law of 36 states and the District of Columbia. What had been 
hoped to be the decision to create change in a major step forward in the criminal justice 
system in reality only resulted in a series of reforms that were focused on the breaches of 
legality thus creating super due process because death is different. One has to consider, had 
Furman not been ruled the way it was, the populist backlash may not have happened and 
capital punishment could have, pun intended, died on the vine.  
It should be noted, however, that Garland (2010) failed to recognize the idea that 
Furman is what ushered in an era that has produced nothing but endless frustration and a 
colossal amount of financial burdens for victims’ relatives as well as all parties involved 
in the legal process and execution of a death sentence and finally for the offenders who 
have been sentenced to death with the uncertainty of their fate. It is as though that receiving 
the death penalty often times is actually receiving life in prison with the ‘chance’ of death.   
Garland (2010) presented what is referred to as the Furman backlash in the ninth 
chapter, which covers the immense amount of criticism that came about almost 
immediately from politicians, mainly republican, and other criminal justice actors (i.e., 
police officers and prosecutors). The argument was made that Furman caused a great 
injustice for victims and posed problems for public safety. This was the first time in 
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American history that the death penalty had become a highly politicized issue. Within the 
first two years following the Furman decision, 35 states had revised and reenacted their 
death penalty statutes and by the end of 1974 a total of 231 new death sentences has been 
handed down.  
Garland (2010) goes into three frames that form the politics of this reaction 
including law and order, states’ rights, and traditional cultural values. Liberalism is often 
held accountable for the violence and disorder in America in the 1960s. The banning effect 
that Furman had on capital punishment can be viewed as a further extension of liberalism 
in what would be considered an extreme form. The law and order frame is critical to 
President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Crime” that came about in 1965. This frame was an 
essential tool to laying the path for Gregg v. Georgia (1976) that would essentially overturn 
the Furman v. Georgia (1972) Supreme Court ruling. The frame of states’ rights, driven 
by populism, comes in as a rebuttal against the overreach of the federal government in a 
counteraction against the idea of big government and a centralized power. Finally, 
Garland’s third frame of traditional cultural values is a bit more multifaceted. This is where 
the Republican Party’s “Southern Strategy” comes into effect which affirms what is known 
as traditional values in a fundamentalist culture in light of religious principles. It may be 
argued that this strategy was the way for government politicians of the South to reestablish 
and pose defiance after the civil rights movement in the 1960s and in return take the largely 
Democratic population of the South, whom felt betrayal at the highest level, and use that 
to convert the South from a sea of blue to a flowing bright red.  
With the reinstatement of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), it is not 
difficult to see just how much of a populist symbol the death penalty is. The use of fear and 
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resentment of political and cultural change has been attributed as a major factor in even 
successfully aiding President Richard Nixon to be elected as the 37th President of the 
United States. The maintenance of this order is vital because as Garland (2010) also states, 
if the levels were to overreach and push boundaries on one another it would push more 
legalism into the system which in return fails to accomplish anything except the possibility 
of local and state lawsuits in response of the counter majoritarian decisions. The structure 
of American government, which is decentralized, sets it apart from the European 
governments and the way decisions such as abolishment are carried out. For instance, while 
American citizens typically often get to express their opinions and vote on laws and legal 
policies, European governments are more capable of imposing policies even when it is 
against popular opinion. It seems, however, that the levels and branches of government 
have become so divided they are easily conquered individually through vulnerability from 
opportunistic politicians and their constituents. This type of politics of popular democracy 
is why President Bill Clinton focused largely on public opinion polls and focus groups 
before imperative decisions were made (Kiousis, 2003).  
PAST STUDIES PUTTING THE MARSHALL HYPOTHESIS TO THE TEST 
A review of the literature produced 29 published studies that tested one or more of 
the separate hypotheses derived from Justice Marshall’s concurring opinion (Bohm, 1989, 
1990; Bohm, Clark, & Aveni, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994, 2004; Bohm, 
Vogel, & Maisto, 1993; Boots, Mallicoat, & Wareham, 2018; Clarke, Lambert, & Whitt, 
2001; Cochran & Chamlin, 2005; Cochran, Sanders, & Chamlin, 2006; Cox, 2013; Diaz & 
Garza, 2015; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Falco & Freiburger, 2011; Kennedy-Kollar& 
Mandery, 2010; Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, 2011; LaChappelle, 2014; Lambert & 
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Clarke, 2001; Lee, Bohm, & Pazzani, 2014; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Mallicoat & 
Brown, 2008; Michel & Cochran, 2011; Sandys, 1995; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar & 
Dittenhoffer, 1981; Vollum, Mallicoat, & Buffington-Vollum, 2009; Wright, Bohm, & 
Jamieson, 1995). Most frequently, the subjects of these studies have been undergraduate 
college students, and surveys were designed based largely off the work of Bohm and his 
colleges (Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm et al, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994, 2004; 
Bohm et al., 1993). As recognized by Cochran and Chamlin (2005), the methodology 
commonly consisted of three elements including: (1) a pretest measure of attitudes toward 
capital punishment, (2) exposure to knowledge about capital punishment, and (3) a post-
test measure of death penalty attitudes. It is noteworthy that the studies mentioned above 
vary in both the quantity and quality of the exposure to capital punishment information the 
subjects obtained. Despite the comparisons in methodology, these studies have a tendency 
to find somewhat mixed though fairly reliable support for the three Marshall hypotheses 
(Cochran & Chamlin, 2005). 
In regard to the first portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis, the literature strongly 
suggests that the average American citizen is both uninformed about the death penalty and 
unaware of whether it achieves its desired outcomes or not (Bohm, 1987, 1989, 1998; 
Bohm et al., 1990, 1991; Bohm, Vogel, & Maisto, 1993; Ellsworth & Ross 1983; Firment 
& Geiselman, 1997; Lambert & Clarke, 2001; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar & 
Dittenhoffer, 1981; Wright et al., 1995). 
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) performed the earliest attempt to verify the second portion 
of Marshall’s hypothesis, and it was followed by a much smaller Canadian study by Vidmar 
and Dittenhoffer (1981). Neither of first two studies listed above focused on the issue of 
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innocence nor how it may affect support for the death penalty. Although Bohm et al. (1991) 
and Sandys (1995) included the matter of innocence as part of the death penalty course, 
they did not test the effect of innocence alone on support for the death penalty. 
Ellsworth and Gross (1994) described the third portion of Marshall’s hypothesis by 
stating, “As support for the death penalty has increased, so has the willingness to endorse 
retribution as a motive” (p. 29). There has been a hardening of hearts in the American 
society toward perceptions of crime during the past 30 years and an increase in social 
acceptance of retribution for criminal acts (Bowers, 1984; Durham, Elrod, & Kinkade, 
1996). However, retribution requires that the individual in question is in fact guilty, not 
innocent, in order to be punished (Lempert, 1983). Under the retributive theory, it is not 
permissible to sentence an innocent person to death, predominantly in light of the fact that 
the death penalty is irrevocable once the actual execution has been carried out (Gross, 
1996). Unfortunately, there is increasing evidence that a substantial number of innocent 
individuals have been sentenced to death (Radelet, Bedau, & Putman, 1992; Radelet, 
Lofquist, & Bedau, 1996; Weinstock & Schwartz, 1998).   
Table 1 is a summary of previous studies testing the Marshall Hypothesis. As 
discussed many of these studies involved a pre- and post-test design, using a death penalty 
class as the stimulus.  But, as shown in the table, many studies did not test all three 
hypotheses. The majority of the findings do show support for the Marshall Hypothesis. 
When limited support is found, the overall results still tend to support hypotheses but there 
was not always support among the subgroups or individual items on the scale.  In some 
cases (e.g., Kennedy-Kollar & Mandery, 2010), there was no statistical change in levels of 
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support after subjects had been presented with information about capital punishment, but 
there were, for some reason, decreases in levels of opposition for the death penalty.     
 
Table 1: Support of the Marshall Hypotheses from Previous Studies* 
 
Author(s) & Date Published 
Sample 
Size 
Key Findings 
M. Hyp. 1 M. Hyp. 2 M. Hyp. 3 
Sarat & Vidmar (1976) 181 Support Support Support 
Lord et al. (1979) 48 --- --- --- 
Vidmar & Dittenhoffer (1981) 39 Support Support --- 
Ellsworth & Ross (1983) 500 Support --- --- 
Bohm (1989) 50 --- Support --- 
Bohm (1990) 109 --- Support --- 
Bohm et al. (1990) 71 --- No --- 
Bohm et al. (1991) 272 Support Limited Support 
Bohm & Vogel (1991) 105 --- Support Support 
Bohm et al. (1993) 106 --- Support --- 
Bohm & Vogel (1994) 222 --- Support --- 
Sandys (1995) 23 --- Support --- 
Wright et al. (1995) 106 Support No ---   
Clarke et al. (2001) 730 --- Limited --- 
Lambert & Clarke (2001) 730 --- Limited --- 
Bohm & Vogel (2004) 69 --- Support --- 
Cochran & Chamlin (2005) 70 Support Support No 
Cochran et al. (2006) 365 Support Support --- 
Mallicoat & Brown (2008) 340 --- Support --- 
Vollum et al. (2009) 927 --- Limited Support 
Kennedy-Kollar & Mandery (2010) 187 --- No --- 
Falco & Freiburger (2011) 20 --- No --- 
Michel & Cochran (2011) 365 Support Support Support 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
Author(s) & Date Published 
Sample 
Size 
Key Findings 
M. Hyp. 1 M. Hyp. 2 M. Hyp. 3 
 
Lambert et al. (2011) 730 --- Support --- 
Cox (2013) 362 Support No --- 
LaChappelle (2014) 216 --- Support --- 
Lee et al. (2014) 338 Support Support No 
Diaz & Garza (2015) 481 --- Limited --- 
Boots et al. (2018) 203 --- No --- 
*This table is a modification and expansion of the a table presented by Cochran (2017) 
 
IDEOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH OPINIONS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 
In general, there are not any universal explanations for public support or opposition 
concerning the use of the death penalty. Research confirms the assumption that death 
penalty perceptions and attitudes are often grounded in an emotional response rather than 
based on any evidentiary support (Bohm, 1989, 2011; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Firment & 
Geiselman, 1997; Lambert, Pasupuleti, & Allen, 2005; Roberts, 1984; Tyler & Weber, 
1982; Vandiver, Giacopassi, & Gathje, 2002; Vollum, Longmire, & Buffington-Vollum, 
2004). Studies have established that individuals who support the death penalty can 
commonly be categorized into the three primary philosophies including deterrence, 
retribution, and incapacitation (Bohm, 1992, 2011; Lambert, Camp, Clarke, & Jiang, 2011; 
Lambert, Clarke, & Lambert, 2004). Deterrence refers to the method of hoping the 
punishment of one criminal will persuade the offender themselves and other citizens who 
witness the punishment to conform to the rules of law. There is a vast amount empirical 
evidence that demonstrates the death penalty has little or no deterrent effect on violent 
crime, even when adding murder to the equation (Archer, Gartner, & Beittel, 1983; Bailey, 
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1974, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1991; Bailey & 
Peterson, 1989; Decker & Kohfeld, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990; Lempert, 1983; 
Paternoster, 1991; Radelet & Akers, 1996; Waldo, 1981; Steiker & Steiker, 2017; Waldo 
& Myers, 2019). In the 1970s, during the get tough on crime era, deterrence was a common 
reason provided for supporting the death penalty. Subsequently, the idea of retribution and 
closure has become more socially acceptable (Fox, Radelet, & Bonsteel, 1991; Kort-Butler 
& Ray, 2019). Retribution refers to a type of revenge which is actually one of the oldest 
forms of punishment going back to an “eye for an eye” or a “life for a life” ideology and 
the perception of achieving ultimate justice (Bohm, 1992; Lambert et al., 2004; Lambert, 
Hogan, Moore, Jenkins, Jiang, & Clarke, 2008). And finally, incapacitation as a philosophy 
suggests that individuals who have been convicted of a crime as heinous as murder in 
capital cases should be executed to prevent them from killing again therefore protecting 
future hypothetical victims (Lambert et al., 2004; Marquart & Sorenson, 1989). Also, 
incorrectly embedded in the notion of incapacitation is the assumption that sentencing an 
offender to life imprisonment is more expensive than executing carrying out an execution 
(Robinson, 2009). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are four different philosophies identified 
for being given by individuals who oppose the death penalty which are comprised of the 
mercy or ethic of care, unfair administration, brutalization of society, and the possibility of 
innocence such as in the case of wrongful convictions (Hood, 2001; Lambert et al., 2004; 
Unnever & Cullen, 2005). Mercy, or ethic of care, refers to the idea that showing 
compassion to offenders is the most important factor as opposed to revenge (Hood, 2001). 
Furthermore, mercy can also be linked to the belief that the death penalty is a demonstration 
18 
of cruelty being carried out (Vandiver et al., 2002). Unfair administration goes back to 
what statistics obviously prove, if a defendant is a person of color then they are 
disproportionally affected by the death penalty, both in race of the offender and race of the 
victim in capital cases (Baumgartner, De Beof, & Boydstun, 2008; DPIC, 2019b). And, 
finally, to look at the ideology of innocence is to understand that the justice system is not 
perfect and can make mistakes like in the case of wrongful convictions. For example, 
organizations such as the Innocence Project have been able to overturn sentences based on 
DNA testing, new evidence, or the discovery of a false witness testimony (Whitt, Clarke, 
& Lambert, 2002; Unnever & Cullen, 2005). According to the Innocence Project’s website 
(2019), since 1989, when the first DNA exoneration took place, there have been 365 
exonerations to date.  
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METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a review of the literature produced 29 
published studies that tested at least some elements of the Marshall Hypothesis. The main 
purpose of this research is to test all three of Marshall’s hypotheses using data from a cross-
sectional survey of students in the College of Justice and Safety at EKU students based on 
a self-administered survey in an attempt to answer the following research questions: 
1. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU generally support or 
oppose the death penalty?  
2. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU lack knowledge about 
the death penalty and its effects? 
3. Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU that are knowledgeable 
about the death penalty generally oppose it? 
4. Is knowledge about capital punishment associated with levels of support for the 
death penalty among the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU 
regardless of levels of belief in retribution as a basis for support for the death 
penalty? 
STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
All students 18 years of age or older who were enrolled in at least one traditional 
or online undergraduate or graduate course offered by the College of Justice and Safety 
during the Spring 2019 term were eligible to participate in this cross-sectional survey. After 
receiving project approval from the Institutional Review Board at EKU, eligible 
participants were sent an invitation to participate in the anonymous web-based survey via 
their EKU student email addresses. The invitation contained standard informed consent 
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information, as well as a hotlink that routed them directly to the online survey if they chose 
to participate (see Appendix A). Upon clicking the survey link, participants were asked to 
verify that they were over the age of 18.  If anyone would have indicated they were not at 
least 18 years of age, they would have been routed away from the survey to a page 
containing a statement of eligibility for participation.  When potential participants verified 
they were at least 18 years old, they were taken to the survey.   
Email invitations were sent to 2321 students via SurveyMonkey collector emails, 
and two survey reminders were sent at one week intervals after the initial invitation. There 
were 211 usable responses when the survey closed.  The response rate of just under 10 
percent is not uncommon for web surveys, and research has established that results can be 
dependable with complete and quality responses (Van Mol, 2017). As shown in Table 2, 
there was a relatively even split between male (49.3%) and female (50.7%) respondents.  
The vast majority (90.0%) of respondents were white, and their ages ranged from 18 to 66, 
with an average of 28.58. More than half of respondents were between 18 and 23. The 
moderate category was chosen most (41.6%) and very liberal was chosen least (3.8%). The 
majority of students identified themselves as somewhat religious (52.6%). There was a 
close to even split between Campus 1 (traditional on-ground) students (57.6%) and Campus 
2 (exclusively online classes) students (42.4%). Most respondents were declared as 
Criminal Justice (28.4%) majors working on their bachelor’s degree. Generally, the 
respondents reported not being afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime (55.5%). 
When asked about their immediate family members (i.e. mother, father, siblings) 
supporting the death penalty, the vast majority of students selected yes that they did 
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(79.7%). Finally, most respondents indicated that a close friend or family member or they 
had never been a victim of a violent crime (60.5%). 
Table 2: Participant Demographics and Personal Experiences 
  n Valid % 
Gender: 
Female 107 50.7 
Male 104 49.3 
   
Race: 
White 189 90 
Other 21 10 
   
Age: 
18-23 112 53.3 
24-66 98 46.7 
   
Political Views: 
Very Liberal 8 3.8 
Liberal 38 18.2 
Moderate 87 41.6 
Conservative 62 29.7 
Very Conservative 14 6.7 
   
Religious Views: 
Very Religious 35 16.7 
Somewhat Religious 110 52.6 
Not Religious 64 30.6 
   
Campus: 
Campus 1 (Traditional On-Ground Classes) 121 57.6 
Campus 2 (ExclusivelyOnline Courses) 89 42.4 
   
Degree Type: 
Corrections & Juvenile Justice Studies (BS) 1 0.5 
Criminal Justice (BS) 60 28.4 
Criminology & Criminal Justice (MS) 15 7.1 
Police Studies (BS) 2 0.9 
Social Justice Studies (BS) 2 0.9 
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Table 2 (continued)   
 n Valid% 
Justice, Policy & Leadership (MS) 8 3.8 
Emergency Medical Care (AS) 5 2.4 
Emergency Medical Care (BS) 12 5.7 
Fire, Arson & Explosion Investigation (BS) 11 5.2 
Fire Protection Administration (BS) 3 1.4 
Fire Protection & Safety Engineering Technology (BS) 11 5.2 
Homeland Security (BS) 21 10 
Occupational Safety (BS) 22 10.4 
Safety, Security & Emergency Management (MS) 26 12.3 
Other Graduate Major 2 0.9 
Double Major 10 4.7 
   
SJS Major: 
Yes 96 45.5 
No 115 54.5 
   
How afraid are you of becoming a victim of a violent crime? 
Very Afraid 14  6.6 
Somewhat Afraid 80 37.9 
Not Afraid 117 55.5 
   
Do most of your immediate family members (i.e. mother, father, siblings) support 
the death penalty? 
Yes 110 79.7 
No 28 20.3 
   
Have you or a close friend/family member ever been a victim of a violent crime? 
Yes 83 39.5 
No 127 60.5 
 
MEASURES 
Other items in the survey were modeled after those used by Bohm et al. (1991) in 
their test of the Marshall Hypothesis and were grouped into three sections.  The first section 
of the survey contained four items intended to gauge participants’ support or opposition 
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for the death penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using a seven-point Likert scale 
(strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree) 
see Appendix B, Table B1 for initial aggregate responses for these items.  The original 
response scale for these items was then modified by removing the neutral responses and 
recoding responses from the other six options into the two categories of support or oppose.  
These four items were then combined (α = .770) to create a composite measure to represent 
overall opinions about the death penalty. A summary of responses to each of these items, 
as well as those described below, are presented in the next chapter.  
 The second section of the survey, also modeled after those used by Bohm et al. 
(1991), contained fourteen items intended to gauge participants’ knowledge of the death 
penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using true or false for the statements given 
See Appendix B, Table B2 for initial aggregate responses for these items. A summary of 
responses of each of these items, are presented in the next chapter.  
The third section of the survey, also modeled after those used by Bohm et al. (1991), 
contained eight items intended to gauge participants’ retributive nature in regard to the 
death penalty. Respondents were asked to respond using a seven-point Likert scale 
(strongly disagree, disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree) 
see Appendix B, Table B3 for initial aggregate responses for these items. A summary of 
responses of each of these items, are presented in the next chapter.  
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RESULTS 
This chapter contains the results of the analyses from data collected from across-
sectional survey of the general population of College of Justice and Safety.  Findings are 
presented under each applicable research question.  The next chapter includes a discussion 
of this research, its limitations, and suggestions for future research in this area.  
Research Question No. 1: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU 
generally support or oppose the death penalty? 
 Table 3 contains results for items measuring support for the death penalty in 
general.  While the majority of respondents supported the death penalty for some 
defendants convicted of first-degree murder (77.5%) and indicated that, as a juror, they 
could convict a defendant that would automatically be sentenced to death if convicted 
(60.4%), fewer than half of survey participants said they could pull the lever that would 
result in death (47.3%) or supported the death penalty for all persons convicted of first-
degree murder (43.1%).  Descriptive statistics for the composite measure created from 
these four items suggest that, overall, about half the respondents support (51.5%) the death 
penalty while the other half (48.5%) oppose it. 
 
Table 3: Items Measuring Support for the Death Penalty  
  n Valid % 
I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 132 56.9 
Support 100 43.1 
   
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 54 22.5 
Support 186 77.5 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
    
 
             n 
 
  Valid% 
If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would 
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant. 
Opposed 82 39.6 
Support      125        60.4 
   
If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an 
individual convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 118 52.7 
Support 106 47.3 
   
Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant agreed with 
three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed with 
at least two items. (α = .770) 
Opposed 82 48.5 
Support 87 51.5 
 
A z-test for differences in proportions was also conducted to compare results among 
the items. The support scale which indicates that the level of support for the statement “I 
support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder.” was 
significantly less than the statements “I support the death penalty for SOME people 
convicted of first-degree murder” (p = .000) and “If I served on a jury in a trial where the 
defendant, if found guilty, would automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that 
defendant.” (p = .007).  
Results for the first research question show that approximately half of the 
participants supported the death penalty when looking at the overall scale (51.5%). When 
considering the second item “I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of 
first-degree murder.” a vast majority of participants supported the death penalty (77.5%). 
Finally, when looking at the first item “I support the death penalty for ALL persons 
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convicted of first-degree murder.” even less than half participants supported the death 
penalty (43.1%).  Interestingly, students majoring within the School of Justice Studies (e.g., 
Criminal Justice, Police Studies, Corrections and Juvenile Justice, Social Justice) were 
significantly (χ2 = 15.554, p = .000) more likely to oppose (66.7%) the death penalty as 
compared to students with majors from other departments and colleges (34.2%). 
Research Question No. 2: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU 
lack knowledge about the death penalty and its effects? 
 This research question was modeled after the first hypothesis used by Bohm et al. 
(1991) to explore part of Justice Marshall’s first hypotheses regarding support for capital 
punishment being associated with the lack of knowledge about it.  Results for the 14 
individual death penalty knowledge items are available in Appendix B, Table B2. Total 
scores for the knowledge of the death penalty portion of the survey ranged from five to 14, 
with an average of 10.60 out of 14, which equates to a C in college level courses (75.71%). 
Only 11.8 percent of respondents received a “failing” score by answering 8 or fewer items 
correctly. Two knowledge items had a higher percentage of being answered incorrectly. 
The first was, “The majority of Americans currently favor the death penalty.” which is a 
true statement although 42.3 percent of respondents thought it should be false. The second 
was, “On average, the death penalty costs the tax payer less than life imprisonment.” which 
is a false statement although 38.6 percent of respondents thought it should be true. 
When examining the knowledge items we found that the results of the study provide 
us with the information that a significance was found when comparing the scores of School 
of Justice Studies majors (?̅? = 11.19) to non-majors (?̅? = 10.15), the School of Justice 
Studies majors scoring higher (t = -4.64, p = .000) (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Knowledge Comparison between SJS Majors v. Non-Majors 
  n Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
SJS Majors 94 11.19 1.505 
Non-Majors 111 10.15 1.780 
 
 Results from a one-way ANOVA indicated that there were significant (F = 2.665, 
p = .034) differences in mean levels of knowledge based on political views. Post hoc 
analysis revealed the only categorical difference was between participants that identified 
as moderates (?̅? = 10.89) and participants that identified as conservatives (?̅? = 10.03) with 
moderates having slightly higher knowledgably than conservatives. None of the other 
analyses using individual characteristics showed a significant difference between the 
categories or experiences relating to the sample and their level of knowledge (Table 5). 
Table 5:  Knowledge Comparison between Political Views   
  n Mean Standard Deviation 
Very Liberal 8 11.25 0.886 
Liberal 38 10.82 1.768 
Moderate 85 10.89 1.746 
Conservative 59 10.03 1.761 
Very Conservative 13 10.69 1.437 
Total Sample 203 10.63 1.742 
   
Research Question No. 3: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU 
that are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it? 
 This research question was modeled after Justice Marshall’s second hypothesis 
regarding whether exposure to information about capital punishment produces sentiments 
in opposition to capital punishment. For this hypothesis, the data regarding support (see 
Table B1) was used to garner if in fact opposition increased as knowledge increased (see 
Appendix B, Table B2). 
28 
 Table 6 contains results for items measuring knowledge versus support comparison. 
Data show that those who were opposed had significantly higher scores on the knowledge 
scale for two of the individual items as well as the total support/opposed scale. Regarding 
the total support/opposed scale, respondents who were opposed to the death penalty scored 
an average of 11.1 out of 14 and those who supported the death penalty scored an average 
of 10.4 out of 14.  
Table 6: Knowledge versus Support Comparison  
  n Mean 
Standard 
t Sig. 
Deviation 
I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 114 11.04 1.615 
3.733 .000  
Support 83 10.13 1.793 
      
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 48 10.9 1.7 
1.143 .255  
Support 155 10.5 1.7 
      
If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would 
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant. 
Opposed 67 11 1.6 
2.286 .023 
Support 108 10.4 1.6 
      
If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an 
individual convicted of first-degree murder. 
Opposed 95 10.9 1.7 
1.397 .164 
Support 87 10.5 1.6 
      
Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant agreed with 
three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed with 
at least two items. (alpha = .770) 
Opposed 70 11.1 1.6 
2.749 .007 
Support 77 10.4 1.6 
 
While the scores associated with knowledge were higher for each item, there was 
only a significant difference for “I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of 
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first-degree murder.” and “If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found 
guilty, would automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant.” as well 
as the overall scale “Total Support/Opposed Scale: Determined Support by if participant 
agreed with three or four of the items, and determined Opposed if participant disagreed 
with at least two items.”  
The analysis ran on the data collected from the survey response does provide 
support for the second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis.   
Research Question No. 4: Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety at EKU 
that are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position of support or 
opposition in regard to the degree of retribution? 
This research question was modeled after Justice Marshall’s third hypothesis 
regarding exposure to information about capital punishment will have little or no impact 
on those who support it for retributive reasons. To examine the effect that retribution has 
on each attitudinal variable, a multivariate binary logistic regression was ran for each of 
the support items as well as the overall attitude towards the death penalty scale. Results 
from these individual items were combined to form an additive index ranging from 8 to 56 
(α = .796). Once removing the “neutral” responses (leaving 74 valid responses) the mean 
ended up being approximately 28.07.  
Binary Logistic Regression 
 Binary logistic regression was conducted to examine how individual 
characteristics/experiences, death penalty knowledge, and retributive sentiments can be 
used to predict whether respondents would support or oppose the death penalty. To 
determine total support versus opposition of the death penalty, if a participant at least 
slightly agreed with three or four of the items in the death penalty support scale, they were 
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considered in support (1), and if a participant at least slightly disagreed with at least two 
items they were considered in opposition (0) (see Appendix B, Table B1). Two initial 
models were constructed based on the two elements—death penalty knowledge and 
retributive sentiments—mentioned in Marshall’s third hypothesis.  The first of these 
models regressed the dichotomous support variable on only one predictor, which was 
knowledge about the death penalty.  The model was significant (χ2 = 7.488, p = .006), 
explained 6.6 percent of the variance in support for the death penalty, and, as expected, 
participants were significantly less likely to be classified as supporters as knowledge 
increased (Exp(B) = .749, wald = 6.944, p = .008).  For the second model, belief in 
retribution was added as a predictor.  This model was also significant (χ2 = 59.547, p = 
..000), and explained 44.4 percent of the variation in support for capital punishment.  
Additionally, as belief in retribution increased, individuals were significantly more likely 
to be in support of the death penalty (Exp(B) = 1.118, wald = 32.356, p= .000).  Further, 
as Marshall hypothesized, knowledge was no longer a significant predictor (wald = 2.353, 
p = .125) of support once the retribution scale was added.  When considering only these 
two items, Justice Marshall was correct based on results from this sample.  However, it is 
possible that other factors based on individual characteristics and experiences may serve 
as significant predictor variables along with knowledge and retributive sentiments.  
Consequently, three more models were created (see Table 7), each of which explained more 
variation in death penalty support than the previous two models. 
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Table 7: Total Support Scale/Composite, Binary Logistic Regression  
  
Individual 
Characteristics/ 
Experiences 
Individual 
Characteristics/ 
Experiences with 
Death Penalty 
Knowledge 
Individual 
Characteristics/Experiences 
with Death Penalty 
Knowledge and Retribution 
  Wald Sig. Exp(B) Wald Sig. Exp(B) Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender 6.357 .012 4.807 7.336 .007 7.254 6.194 .013 8.545 
Race 1.912 .167 3.33 2.59 .108 4.735 1.077 .299 3.271 
Fear of 
Violent 
Crime 
0.411 .814 --- 0.09 .956 --- 0.005 .998 --- 
Family 
Support of 
Death Penalty 
1.762 .184 2.919 2.27 .132 3.83 2.277 .131 5.203 
Age 0.426 .514 0.968 0.816 .366 0.953 1.388 .239 0.929 
Political 
Views 
2.369 .668 --- 2.006 .735 --- 1.344 .854 --- 
Friend/Family 
Member Has 
been Victim 
0.557 .455 0.639 0.854 .355 0.549 0.643 .423 0.555 
Religion 0.662 .718 --- 0.556 .757 --- 0.973 .615 --- 
Online v. On 
Ground 
2.943 .086 0.153 3.08 .079 0.121 1.623 .203 0.173 
Degree Type 0.745 .689 --- 0.207 .902 --- 0.015 .992 --- 
SJS Major 
(Yes or No) 
0.933 .334 0.536 0.152 .697 0.759 1.685 .194 0.328 
              
Knowledge 
Scale 
--- --- --- 6.935 .008 0.583 5.458 .019 0.589 
              
Retribution 
Scale 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 10.282 0.001 1.17 
              
Model 
Information 
(ꭓ2 = 44.762,  
p = .000) 
(ꭓ2 = 50.621,  
p = .000) 
(ꭓ2 = 63.801,  
p = .000) 
              
Nagelkerke R 
Square  
.493 .555 .657 
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 The first model contained only variables based on individual characteristics and 
experiences. The overall model was significant (ꭓ2 = 44.762, p = .000) and explained about 
50 percent of the variation. Factors such as political views, fear of crime, age, and most 
other individual characteristics/experiences were not significant. Gender was the only 
individual characteristic that was significant (p = .012) in the model. Consistent with 
previous studies, males were almost five times more likely than females to support death 
penalty. 
 The death penalty knowledge scale was added for the second model. This model 
was also significant (ꭓ2 = 50.621, p = .000) and explained about 55.5 percent of the 
variance. Again, no individual characteristics/experiences aside from gender were 
significant. As in the first model, males were significantly more likely than females to 
support the death penalty. Knowledge of the death penalty was also significant (p = .008); 
respondents were less likely to support the death penalty as scores on the knowledge scale 
increased. 
 The retributive scale was added for the third model. This model was also significant 
(ꭓ2 = 63.801, p = .000) and explained 65.7 percent of the variance, the most of the three 
models. Gender and knowledge were still significant in the same direction and the scale 
measuring retribution was significant (p = .001) as well. As expected, higher scores on the 
retributive scale were associated with support of the death penalty. The final model shows 
that when controlling for all individual characteristics/experiences, both knowledge and 
retribution are significant correlates of support/opposition.  
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DISCUSSION 
Research for this thesis tested four research questions regarding the death penalty 
and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s hypotheses in his Furman (1972) decision. While many 
studies have tested these hypotheses using a pretest/posttest method, data for this research 
came from a cross-sectional online survey that took a single snapshot glance into the 
opinions, characteristics, and death penalty knowledge of College of Justice and Safety 
students at EKU. This research also contributes to the literature because all three of 
Marshall’s hypotheses were tested, which is not common among existing studies.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the research presented in this thesis considers individual characteristics 
and experiences, in addition to factors mentioned by Marshall, as predictors of support for 
death penalty.  
With regard to the first research question “Do the students of the College of Justice 
and Safety at EKU generally support or oppose the death penalty?” the study provided us 
with the results that over half (51.5%) of students surveyed do in fact support the death 
penalty. This result is comparable to the National average according to the Death Penalty 
Information Center (2019a), with more individuals in favor (55%) of capital punishment 
than opposed (41%). Some studies have found greater support for the death penalty among 
criminal justice majors (Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998; Lambert et al., 2008) while 
other studies have reported no significant difference between criminal justice majors and 
non-criminal justice majors (Robbers, 2004; Schadt & DeLisi, 2007). When breaking down 
findings for support between the majors and non-majors within the School, results show 
that majors are significantly more likely to oppose the death penalty (majors: 66.7%, 
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nonmajors: 34.2%) and nonmajors were more likely to support the death penalty 
(nonmajors: 65.8%,  majors: 33.3%).  
The second research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety 
at EKU lack knowledge about the death penalty and its effects?” measures the first portion 
of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. Total scores for the knowledge of the death penalty 
portion of the survey ranged from five to 14, with an average of 10.60 out of 14, which 
equates to a C grade on a standard grading scale (75.71%). When comparing death penalty 
knowledge, results show School of Justice Studies majors had significantly higher average 
scores on the overall knowledge scale. In Bohm et al. (1991)’s study, it is noteworthy to 
mention that School of Justice Studies majors scored an average of 79.9 percent with non-
majors scoring an average of 72.5 percent compared to Bohm et al. (1991) scoring an 
average 79 percent after the course had been completed (54% on the pretest). When 
comparing the results to a more recent study, conducted by Lee et al. (2014), they were 
drastically higher than the scores averaged on both their experimental group who had taken 
the course (58.8%) as well as the comparison group who had not completed the course 
(38.5%). Results of this study indicate that, on average, these participants were relatively 
knowledge about the death penalty.  Therefore, there was not support Justice Marshall’s 
first hypothesis among this sample of students.  
The third research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety 
at EKU that are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it?” measures 
the second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. By looking at the overall scale (as 
shown in Table 6) students who opposed the death penalty did score higher on the 
knowledge portion of the survey (79.3%) than those who supported the death penalty 
35 
(74.3%). The results of my study provided direct support for the second portion of Justice 
Marshall’s hypothesis. 
The fourth research question, “Do the students of the College of Justice and Safety 
at EKU that are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position of support 
or opposition in regard to the degree of retribution?” measures the second portion of 
Justice Marshall’s hypothesis. When considering only knowledge and retribution, the 
results do provide support for this portion of the hypothesis. However, there is not support 
for this hypothesis when controlling for individual characteristics and experiences. When 
controlling for factors such as gender and race, knowledge is still a significant predictor of 
support for the death penalty. When adding in controls for levels of belief in retribution, 
knowledge is still a significant predictor of support for the death penalty.   
In general, results of this study provide some support for two of the three 
hypotheses defined by Justice Marshall. The first portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis 
states the public lacks knowledge regarding the death penalty.  Findings presented here 
indicate that, on average, these participants were relatively knowledge about the death 
penalty. The second portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis states that individuals who 
are knowledgeable about the death penalty generally oppose it. Consistent with many other 
studies testing this hypothesis (Bohm, 1989; 1990; Bohm & Vogel, 1991; 1994; 2004; 
Bohm et al., 1993; Cochran & Chamlin, 2005; Cochran et al., 2006; LaChappelle, 2014; 
Lambert et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Mallicoat & Brown, 2008; Michel & Cochran, 2011; 
Sandys, 1995; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, 1981), results of this study 
provide direct support for the statement. The third portion of Justice Marshall’s hypothesis 
states that individuals who are knowledgeable about the death penalty change their position 
36 
of support or opposition in regard to the degree of retribution. Several studies have 
produced support for this postulation (Bohm & Vogel, 1991; Bohm et al., 1991; Michel & 
Cochran, 2011; Sarat & Vidmar, 1976; Vollum et al., 2009), but findings from this sample 
yielded mixed support for this idea in that the hypothesis was supported only when 
examining those two factors; however; it did not hold true when controlling for individual 
characteristics and experiences.   
As with any research project, there are limitations that should be discussed.  The 
target population for this study was students enrolled in courses offered by the College of 
Justice and Safety at EKU; findings do not represent the population of all EKU students or 
the American public, which was the subject of Justice Marshall’s discussion.  It would be 
interesting to replicate this study among all EKU students to see, for example, if and how 
levels of knowledge and opinions about the death penalty differ between physics majors 
and students majoring within the School of Justice Studies. Also, the survey did not include 
items measuring whether participants had ever taken a death penalty class or been enrolled 
in a course in which a specific section was dedicated to discussing the death penalty. This 
information could be an important mediating variable for levels of knowledge about the 
death penalty.   
Many different measures and research designs (e.g., the pre/post-test design around 
a death penalty course) have been used to gauge opinions and knowledge about the death 
penalty. While the measures used this study were based on those used in prior research and 
had good statistical reliability with this sample, it is almost impossible to create perfect 
indicators of true attitudes and opinions. 
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Another limitation would be that the response rate came in just under 10 percent. 
While is not uncommon for web surveys, and research has established that results can be 
dependable with complete and quality responses (Van Mol, 2017), it is still limiting to the 
external validity and generalization of results. And last it is important to know that with 
study being a cross-sectional design we aren’t to conclude that knowledge causes 
opposition.  
It is important to continue researching all of Justice Marshall’s ideas, especially 
among college students, some of whom will become lawmakers and, all of whom, if they 
are American citizens, have or will have the opportunity to vote on laws and policy.  
Populism often appeals to ordinary people who may be uninformed when it comes to the 
facts. Knowledge about an issue can only lead to more informed decisions, and given the 
many controversies that surround capital punishment in the United States, it is important 
to continue to use empirical data to educate citizens about issues so that they may make 
cognizant decisions as they cast their ballots.  
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Table B1: Support Items 
  n Valid % 
I support the death penalty for ALL persons convicted of first-degree murder. 
Strongly Disagree 51 19.8 
Disagree 47 18.2 
Slightly Disagree 34 13.2 
Neutral 26 10.1 
Slightly Agree 43 16.7 
Agree 33 12.8 
Strongly Agree 24 9.3 
   
I support the death penalty for SOME people convicted of first-degree murder. 
Strongly Disagree 26 10.1 
Disagree 17 6.6 
Slightly Disagree 11 4.3 
Neutral 18 7 
Slightly Agree 47 18.2 
Agree 82 31.8 
Strongly Agree 57 22.1 
   
If I served on a jury in a trial where the defendant, if found guilty, would 
automatically be sentenced to death, I could convict that defendant. 
Strongly Disagree 37 14.5 
Disagree 22 8.6 
Slightly Disagree 21 8.2 
Neutral 51 19.9 
Slightly Agree 29 11.3 
Agree 58 22.7 
Strongly Agree 38 14.8 
   
If asked to do it, I could pull the lever that would result in the death of an 
individual convicted of first-degree murder. 
Strongly Disagree 71 27.7 
Disagree 30 11.7 
Slightly Disagree 15 5.9 
Neutral 34 13.3 
Slightly Agree 35 13.7 
Agree 36 14.1 
Strongly Agree 35 13.7 
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Table B2: Knowledge Items   
  n Valid % 
The death penalty has been abolished by a majority of Western European 
Nations. (T) 
True  191 88 
False 26 12 
   
Over the years, states that had the death penalty have shown lower murder rates 
than neighboring states that did not have the death penalty. (F) 
True  41 18.9 
False 176 81.1 
   
Studies have not found that abolishing the death penalty has any significant effect 
on the murder rate in a state. (T) 
True  139 64.7 
False 76 35.3 
   
Studies have shown that murder rates usually drop in the weeks following a well-
publicized execution. (F) 
True  66 30.8 
False 148 69.2 
   
The average prison term served by someone sentenced to life imprisonment is less 
than 10 years. (F) 
True  48 22.2 
False 168 77.8 
   
Poor people who commit murder are more likely to be sentenced to death than 
rich people. (T) 
True  192 89.3 
False 23 10.7 
   
After the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972, the murder rate 
in the U.S. showed a sharp upturn. (F) 
True  75 35.2 
False 138 64.8 
   
On average, the death penalty costs the taxpayer less than life imprisonment. (F) 
True  83 38.6 
False 132 61.4 
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Currently, there are over one thousand people awaiting execution in the United 
States. (T) 
True  176 82.2 
False 38 17.8 
   
The punishment of death has typically been imposed in only a small fraction of 
the cases where it is an authorized punishment. (T) 
True  189 87.5 
False 27 12.5 
   
The majority of Americans currently favor the death penalty. (T) 
True  91 42.3 
False 124 57.7 
   
Even when convicted of similar crimes, men have been more likely to be executed 
than women. (T) 
True  210 97.2 
False 6 2.8 
   
Currently, the leadership of organized religion in the United States (whether 
Catholic, Jewish, or Protestant) has abandoned its traditional support of (or 
silence on) the death penalty and instead favors its complete abolition. (T) 
True  151 69.9 
False 65 30.1 
   
The majority of executions in the United States take place in the South. (T) 
True  187 86.2 
False 30 13.8 
 
  
62 
Table B3: Retribution Items   
  n Valid % 
If a murderer is not executed for the crime, the friends or family of the victim are 
likely to take it upon themselves to seek revenge. 
Strongly Disagree 20 9.4 
Disagree 80 37.6 
Slightly Disagree 18 8.5 
Neutral 32 15 
Slightly Agree 37 17.4 
Agree 21 9.9 
Strongly Agree 5 2.3 
   
The very worst of the Nazi war criminals should have been executed for their 
"crimes against humanity." 
Strongly Disagree 9 4.2 
Disagree 16 7.5 
Slightly Disagree 12 5.6 
Neutral 13 6.1 
Slightly Agree 31 14.6 
Agree 52 24.4 
Strongly Agree 80 37.6 
   
Those who take a life should forfeit their own in return. 
Strongly Disagree 23 10.9 
Disagree 41 19.4 
Slightly Disagree 36 17.1 
Neutral 43 20.4 
Slightly Agree 36 17.1 
Agree 20 9.5 
Strongly Agree 12 5.7 
   
Killing is all right if the right people do it and think they have a good reason for 
doing it. 
Strongly Disagree 58 27.2 
Disagree 54 25.4 
Slightly Disagree 27 12.7 
Neutral 33 15.5 
Slightly Agree 22 10.3 
Agree 13 6.1 
Strongly Agree 6 2.8 
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Members of society have a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like 
murder has been committed. 
Strongly Disagree 57 26.8 
Disagree 67 31.5 
Slightly Disagree 18 8.5 
Neutral 30 14.1 
Slightly Agree 23 10.8 
Agree 12 5.6 
Strongly Agree 6 2.8 
   
Sometimes I have felt a sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was 
sentenced to a penalty less than death. 
Strongly Disagree 33 15.5 
Disagree 48 22.5 
Slightly Disagree 13 6.1 
Neutral 35 16.4 
Slightly Agree 37 17.4 
Agree 36 16.9 
Strongly Agree 11 5.2 
   
There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal 
satisfaction. 
Strongly Disagree 32 15 
Disagree 45 21.1 
Slightly Disagree 11 5.2 
Neutral 43 20.2 
Slightly Agree 27 12.7 
Agree 35 16.4 
Strongly Agree 20 9.4 
   
An execution would make me sad, regardless of the crime the individual 
committed. 
Strongly Disagree 18 8.5 
Disagree 53 24.9 
Slightly Disagree 24 11.3 
Neutral 42 19.7 
Slightly Agree 36 16.9 
Agree 32 15 
Strongly Agree 8 3.8 
 
